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COJl'IPETITIOli  POLICY  AS  .AlT  ELEI'-'!ENT  OF  I;UROPEAN  AGRICULTURAL  POLICY* 
I. 
po!!!Eeti  tio~.J.....market  and  structural ;eolicies 
1.  IL  the  EEC  Treaty there is a  Chapter  on rules  of competition,  originally 
c>.pplica1Jle  only to  p:.codt'.ction  of and  trade in industrial  goods.  An 
exception vms  made  for agricultural produce  c:nd  this logically continued 
to be  the  case  so long  2.s  national market  organizations  or similar national 
rules  governed agriculture.  The  effect and perhaps the  eim  of these 
national ru.les  was  generally to give  domestic  u.griculture  a  competitive 
advantage  ever foreip,11  produce.  Hence before  a  common  body of law on 
coLJpeti  tion could ·o-e  applied to e.gricul  ture in the  six founder States of 
the European Community,  it was  necessary to adopt  s.  conunon  agricul  tura1 
policy. 
*This  p~per is based on  a  address  given  on 7  June  1974  by  Dr  Klaus  Otto  Hass, 
Hea.d  of Division in the Directore,te-General for Agric.:ul ture  of the 
Commission  of the  European Communities,  before  the Danish Council  on 
Agriculture in Copenhagen. - 2  -
Cons~quently 1  the competition rules in the EEC  Treaty became  applicable to 
agricultural production and  trade at  about  the  time  when  national market 
organizations gave  way  to the European  organization.  Since  then,  the 
provisions of the EEC  Treaty  on State aids and,to some  ezter.t,  the  rules  on 
restrictive practices have  genera.lly been applice,ble  to agriculture too. 
Hm·1ever,  the  competition provisions of the  EEC  Treaty are not  automatically 
a~pl~cable since, under Article 42,  they are  subject to the  adoption of 
other provisions.  Accordingly,  a  number  of agricultural  regule,tions  lay 
down  special provisions requirin,r; or prohibiting nationa.l  or Community  c.~c 1.s 
for pa.rticular sectors of agricultural production.  Some  of these  regulations 
give special responsibilities to producers•  organizations within the  Community 
market  organization.  These  provisions,  being of a  specific nature,  prevail 
over the  general  provisions  of competition law in the  Treaty. 
2~  More  improtant than these  specific rules,  which vary from  sector to 
sector of agriculture,  is the  fact that the  Community  market  policy embodied 
in the  agricultural regulations actually uses  competition as  a  means  of 
achievi.ng its object.  The  guaranteed disposal  of agricul  tut·al production 
at  a  fixed minimum  price  (intervention price) in effect helps to stabili3e 
prices  and  thereby  influences  competition and  tbi.s,' as  has  already been 
found,  does  not  only  apply in cases of surplus production.  However,  as 
soon as  the  m~rket price for a  given product  exceeds the  intervention price, 
the  regulations leave price formation  on  the market to the free  interpl~ 
of competition with all tts consequences. - 3  - X/469/74-E 
Ever  more  important  is the  contribution made  by the market  regulations to 
competition by  opening up  the  economic  frontiers between Member  States and 
facilitating free trade  in arricultural produce.  There is no  doubt  that 
competition has been  shl",rpened  to an unprecedented extent.  It is precisely 
an efficient agricultural  system which benefits from  such free  trade. 
Even the compensatory  amounts  appJied in trade .with the new  Membe~ States 
haYe  no major effect  on freedom  of intern<.tional  trc-..de,  for they are tl) 
be removed.  as price levels are progressively aligned.  on price ::.evels in 
the  orip:inal  six Member States,  either by virtue of transitional  arrangements 
or as  a  result  of exchange  rate fluctuationsi  this will at least be  the 
case  as  long  as  the  compensR.tory  amounts  are  fixed at  economically correct 
levels.  For irstarice,  it is impressive  to note the  extent to which 
Denamrk  has  increased its exports  of agricultural produce  ~nd food  pr~ducts 
into the Federal  Republic  follo\-ring accessior..  These  exports  rose  from 
some  m-~  56G  million in 1972  to  roughly mr  900 million in 1973.  If  we 
further cot1side:- that Denmark  1 s  share  of total food  imp rots into the 
Federal Rerublic  thereby rose  from 2.2'/  to 3.27&,  it is clesr that D2nish 
agriculture and  food production are highly  comy,Jetitive,  to  an extent t-lhich 
is only possible when  farms  operate  on  modern lines. 
Another point  worth mentioning as  rega,rds the  competition aspect  of the 
common  agricultural policy lies in the fact  that the Commission's  price 
proposals are more  and  more  tending to be prepared by  reference  to  modern 
farms,  i.e.  1  farms  \-:hich  over a  period of years  are in a  position to bring 
in an  average  earned income  compara.ble  with income  derived from non-
agricultural activities. X/469/74-E 
. 3.  Commission  estimates  admi tted.ly  show that  1  in the Gommun: ty  1  only 
some  12%  of the  5. 7 million farms  working more  than one hectare. can be 
regarded as modern  farms  1  although these  account for almost  a  half of 
agriculturc.l  production in the  Community.  HoHever,  the vast majority 
of farms  in the  Co~nity are in a  comparatively unfavourable situation 
e~d these are the  farms  at  which  structural  ~nd regional measures  are 
a.imed.  Ever since the first agricultural market  regulations were  adopted 
in 1962,  agricultural  structural policy he.s  played an  important  role 
side by  side with market policy.  Here  a.ttention should be paid particular-
ly to the  individual projects for impr·oving production and marketing, 
finai1ced 'by  the Guidance Section of the European Agricu:).tural  Fund,  and 
the  directives  of the European Community,  which together form  the 
Mansholt  Plan.  Thei~ aim  is to contribute to the modernization of farms 
b~r  investment aids,  outgoer payments  and annuities and measures  to promote 
the retraining of agricultural workers.  A further directive is likely 
to enter into force  this yea.r,  providing assistance  for agriculture in 
mountainous. areas  and other poorer farming areas  •. 
These  instruments of the  E~ropean agricultual poliqy provide the background 
for the  follo11>1ing  analysis,  'l>lhich  deals more  specifically with the 
competition angle.  These  is no  doubt that agriculture.l  structura.l  and 
regional policies  and market  and price policies have  often .been regarded 
as more  important  tha~ competition policy,  for a  competitive agricultural 
system vrill  ta.ke  a  different  approach to compe-tition policy than the large 
mass  of farms  which  cannot  hope to solve their income  problems purely.by 
means  of price  and market policies without  structural adaptation. - 5 - X/469/74-E 
II. 
Distortions of  competition~n--general 
4. It is precisely those  farmers  who  suffer from unfavourable  geographical 
or structural  circumstances  t-.rho  axe  sometim<::·s  temp"'.;ed  to regard these 
circumstru1ces  as  a  distortion of conpetition.  However,  cost  fa.ctors 
facing individua.l  farmers,  ::.uch  as  size  of the  farm or,  Khe.t  is more 
important,  its location and  accoDpanying circumstances  such  as distance 
from  tlle  ne2.rest  market  or infrastructure,  are not  so much  distortions 
of aompetition as. factors  determining hovl profitable the  farm  can be; 
faced t'li th them the  fanner must  decide whether  and how  he  is to  continue 
agricultural production. 
On  the  other hand  1  macro-economic differences between  one  economy  and 
another  can lead to distortions of competition such  as t-Jere  found,  although 
e.dmi tte<ily temporarily  1  in various energy-intensive areas of egricul  tural 
pr~x:J.uction following the  energ;· crisis in the European  Community. 
Natur2.lly,  the economie (including agriculture)  of a  State vJhere 1  for 
vrl1atever  re~son,  energy is cheaper than-in another State,  will have  a 
competitive  advantage  over that other Ste.te.  The  same  clearly applies 
in general  terms  to the  development  of overheads  and  the  influence  of 
divergent  rates  of inflation in Jliiember  States on  their level.  In these 
cases  •-re  2.re  dealing vii  th macro--ecoYl.omic  distortions of competition which, 
from  the  legal  angle,  conld certa.i:1ly be  removed by directives  or other 
Commnni ty measures for  instance of enGrg{,  tro:.ns_r-ort  and  tax pol:i.cy 11here 
their repercussions are  par-t.icular:tJ serious.  It should,  however, 
be borne in mind that  such  macr·)-ec~.nomic fluctua.tions  as  influence more 
than one  bre.nch  or the  economy  further affect the balaxwe  of payments - 6- X/469/74-E 
situation and  can even  cnfluence  exchange  rates.  Specifically e.gricul  turP..l 
measures  alone  may  have .a  temporary mitigating effect  on  these  general 
distortions of competition but  cannot be  maintained in the  long-term unless 
they  are bl?cked  up  b;y  other policies,  particularly in the  economic  and 
monet2ry field. 
Nevertheless it must  be  said that  as the  law  stands divergent  macro-
economic  developments  in the  i11di vidual  Sta:i;es  - as pointed  out by  the 
Commission  in its November  1973  Memorandum  on  the  improvement  of the 
common  agricultural policy - give rise to long-term distortions of 
competition v<hich  are peculiar to agriculture  1  for the  common  ~<rricul  tural 
prices  fixed in units of account  a.re  not  increa.sed after devaluation in 
the develuing  country  a..Y!d  are  no.t  .reduced. after revaluation in the  revaluing 
country but,  under the present  rules,  are generally maintained at the level 
which  applied before the  change  in parity.  The  economic  consequences  of 
these  exchange  rates 1-rhich,  although in practice they have  changed,  remain 
as  they were  for agriculture,  are  offset by paying subsidies  on·. imports 
into the devaluing country and  charging levies on  imports into the 
revaluing country.  ~1is may  well be  reasonable  over a  limited period of 
time  for it avoids making agriculture  (by  reducing prices in case of 
revaluation)  or consumers  (by raising prices in cases of devaluation) bear 
the  effects of the  changed.  currency situation from  011e  day to  the next. 
Yet  in the  lon~ term,  the  perma~ent system  of border taxes gradually 
isolates agriculture from  its general  economic  context  in the relevant 
countries following the monetary events.  Hence  it may  be bettor for the 
future  to reconsider the policy of imposing border taxes withouttime 
limi  tso - 7  - X/469/74-E 
III. 
STNrE  AIDS 
6.  The  Community has greater powers to act  on  specific distortions of 
competition of tho  type  repent"dly  coming into exister"ce  as  a  rcsul  t  of 
nai  t anal  subsidy p0li  cies  in agriculture than  elsewhere in the  economy  as 
a  whole.  The  European Commission has  comprehensive  and.  in meny  cases 
e:::clusive  power to rnoni tor Pnd  coordinate national  aid  schemes.  The 
relevant provisions of the  h~C Treaty  (Articles92-94)  provide  th~t the 
ComTJiisflion  must  be  informed,  in sufficient time to enable it to  submit  its 
comments 1  of any  pJ.nns  to r,-rant  or alter aid before  they are actually 
implemented.  This is a  raclicc:-.1  procedural provision which  sharply affects 
tho  legislative powers  of  the Member  States;  it means  that  every year 
several dozen nc:dione.l  agricul  tura-1  aid schemes  Dre  notified by Governments 
to the Brussels  Co~nission or are  examined by the  Co~ission on its ovm 
initiative with  a  view to verifying their eompatibili  ty with the  cormnon 
ma.rket. 
The  EEC  Treaty further provides that the  Commission  shell,  in cooperation 
with Member  States,  keep under  constant  review all  systems  of aid  existin~ 
in those States,  and  propose to  -the  latter any appropriate measures 
required. by  the progressive development  or by the functioning of the 
common  market. 
In both cr,ses,  i.e., when  new  na-tional  projects  and when  existing projects 
are  cxa~ined, the  Commission  Crill  at  any  time  ir.stitute proceedings against 
the  relevcmt  Member  State where  it finds thd the  aid is not  compatible 
with the  common  market. - 8  ,... 
Thus  the decisive question in respect  of Community  aid policy is this: 
What  aids  are to be  regarded e,s  incompatible with  tho  common  mc:.rket? 
The  answer is basically to be  found  in Article 92(1)  of the  EEC  Treaty, 
which  "-'eads  a.s  follows: 
11Save  as  other<.;ise  provided in this Treaty,  any  aid granted by  a  Member 
State or through State resources in any  form  whatsoever which  distorts 
or threatens to distort  competition by  favouring certain undertakin~s 
or the production of certain goods  shall,  in so  far as it affects trcd.e 
between rJ:ember  States, be  incompatible vTith  the  common  market. 11 
Hence  the decisive factor in deciding whether  an  aid is incompatible with 
the  common  market is whether  or not it affects trade between Member  States. 
The  directness of their influence on  international trade depends  on  the 
closeness to the trading stage  of the point  at which  the aid is grcmted. 
Hence  n  national  subsid;:r  on  exports to other Community  countries  is clearly 
not permissible.  HoHever  the financinG  of agricultural  structure measures 
is less easy to  judge.  Here  a  measure  will  often be  seen as  compatible 
with the  common  market  where  the aid promotes  the  improvement  of agricultu-
ral structure  so  as to help  agriculture to aejust to the  circumstances  of 
a  modern  industrial  society end make  it more  competitive. 
?.  Over  the years the  Commission  h~s begun settling and clarifying its 
law on  national aid policies.  For instance in 1966  the principle was 
established that all aids  which  are directly linked with the quantities or 
prices of agricultural produce  or with  areas under cultivation were 
incompatible with the  common  market.  These  aids directly impede  the 
smooth  wcrki:ng  of the  common  market,  particularly of the  common  prices, - 9- X/469/74-E 
and  tb e  Commission h2.s  accorcling:ly  adoJ:)ted tho principle that they y,rill 
:r:ot  be  cllm-ved.  For their part the Member Stdes have  broug...~t  their 
na·ciot.E'.l  :J.gr:..cul tural policies into line v:i th this Community principle. 
A furth0r  elomer;t  of legal certainty and at tile  same  time  of neutrality 
of compdi  tion vras  introduced. into the  coll'mo:r:  agricultural policy by 
brin~~·ing investment  e,ids  for  f<>rms,  particularly for fan:s  sGeking to 
mooerrize,  undei· uniform rules  thrm.'.ghout  the  Cor..nnu:ity.  The  rules are 
laid  do~r.n  in t:1e  1972  Direc-tive;  on  the  rr.odernization of farms.  Apart 
from its 3tructural  si,_;nifice.nce,  its function in relation to competition 
lies in the  fact that modern  farms  and  farms  \..Jhich  are trying to be  modern 
ar(.  as  far as possible treated in the  sar:1e  l[ey.  It is precisely those 
farms  which  operate  e:~ccording to tho  scme  economic principles which  c.re 
to be  regc·.rded  as  coDpeti  tors.  From thi.s poir.t of vie"''  Nhat  is left 
of the 1968  ~~an2hol  t  P::.an  has  al:Jo been  a  source  of progress  in competition 
policy. 
Apart,  for the  moment,  from  investment  aids for  farms  which,  regardless of 
sector,  are  subject to uniform rules,  the  EuropGan Commission hns  cnd.eavou>~·,_'.. 
to  introduce Directive8  on  the grant of aids in all cectors of agriculture  • 
.  3t.·rious  difficu],  tics hc:wo  stood in the  we:y  of t?:1eso  er:deavours both in the 
past  a.'1d  d  present.  For  a  number  of reasons,  simp~y reading the 
acricul  tural budgets  of the  1-~ember Strotes  docs not  give  a  full picture of 
the  ac~ual amounts  of aid paid. Firstl;r,  the  object of indiviclual budgeta!'jr  iteos is not  Ct.lwr.;ys  oe.sy 
enoue;h  to understandj  sE::condly 1  budget  est.imc:.tes  and actual  e::...rper.di ture 
are not  identical  and thirdly,  not  all agricultural subsidies in the 
~1ember S-tates  appear in the budget.  Moreover  any "Jd  ver by  e.  State of 
its righ-t  to collect r.1one:y  in amounts not  specified. in the bud[;et  also 
has the  character of a  subsidy.  Nevertheless in the horticulture and sugar 
sectors,  the  Commission has  managed to  ruggest  whnt  2-re  lmo~m  G.s  objective: 
measures,  although these had  to be  revised following. the  c.ccession of 
Denmark,  Irel2.nd and the  United Kingdom.  It can still be  expected that 
Community principles for nationcl  aid schemes  will be  clarified before 
the  end  of this year. 
Aids  to stock breeo.ing r:re  now  being e:.r_amined  in Brussels;  the firct 
results  are  axpectod in the  second hc-.lf  of this year.  The  full  gamut  of . 
general  aid schemes,  which often have  n  decisive  influence  on competition, 
remain to be  investic;ated.  Tb.eir  iffiportance  becomes  clear \'/hen it is 
realized that  they include  a~:;ric-..tl tural credit arrangements. 
8.  In all this the  Commission is endeavouring to  tal~e  t'.ccount  both  ?f 
the rul0s of competition cmd  of the specific components  of its agric·..tl tural 
policy.  Faturally there  are cases where  the  rules developed as  p2...rt  of 
the  genercl  competition  polio~· also determine  how  the rules  on  coinpeti  tion 
will  apply to agricultural production· and trade.  A  case in point  woulc1 . 
. be  aido  financed  from  "~<That  are k:r.oWhas  p~afiscal charges,  i.e.,  charges 
havir:.g  an effect equivalent to taxes. 
These  aids are  distinguished from  other state subsidies not  so  much  by 
their object or the  w~ in which  they are  given as by  the  source  of the 
finr:mcc.  Accordingly the  Sa.Iile  considerations  applied to these  aids  as to 
other aiQs.  They may  not  lead to distortions of competition nor affect -11- X/469/74-E 
trade behveen Member  States;  above  all they must  be notified to Brussels. 
Obviously the parafiscel  category  does  not  extend to services provided 
by members  of a  voluntar;~r association.  These  are not  state aic.s.  They 
only become  state aids when  the State provides or controls them by  h.>.w 
or by  any other means.  There  are no  objection8 to  contri~Qtion to such 
measur~s as  long as  or~y domestic producers  or products are  subject to 
them  and  imported goods  are not  affected.  In these cases the  Commission 
investigates the aids v:i thout  raising objections to the actual  source of 
finance. 
On  oce2.sions it has been mr.intained that subsidies financed in this  way  a:re 
not aids within the  meaning of the  EEC  Treaty since they  are provided qy 
the beneficiaries themsolvos  and  thus do  not  give  thorn  a  competitive 
advantage.  The  Commission has felt unable to adoptthis  view.  It rather 
holds that there is an "aid of whatever kind",  as  the Treaty puts it, 
whenever State  funds  (including contributions from  pe.rafiscal charges 
imposed by  law)  arc mede  available to given underte~ings.  Another 
question to be  asked is vthether and to vrhat  extent these aids are liable 
to affect  competition.  In analysing these  questions it may  be  important 
to consider whether the beneficiary l1imself has contributed-all or part 
of the  cost,  or even more  than they cost.  The  provision of subsidies by 
the beneficiaries themselves is thus  a  criterion for  judging the  subsidies 
but  does not  automatically mean  that the  aids Hill be  regarded as having a 
neutre.l  effect  on  compcti  tion. 
There  is difficulty in anlllysing parmiscnl  charges which  are  imposed 
both  on  do~estic production and  on  products  imported from  other Member 
Stdes.  In these  cases undertakings  and producers in the  other Member - 12  - X/469/74-E 
State contribute to  finn.ncing aids in a  Member  Stnte· on  a  rising scale: 
the  more  they sell in the  relevn.nt  !>~ember St::::te,  the  more  they finance  a 
nubsidy for the benefit  of their own  competitors,  Here  the financial 
basis for the  aids provides protection going beyond the  effect of,the aids 
themselves.  In its  gro~~ng corpus  of case decisions,  supported by  the 
European Court  of Justice,  the  Co~ission has in £Uch  cases  required 
imported goods  to be  exempt  from  such  charges. 
9.  Even if the  competition rules in the Treaty are in the long-term 
applied to agriculture,  th~re will repeatedly be unexpected circumstances 
rlhich Member  States will  seek to deal  with by paying subsidies.  Such 
problems  recently arose  from  the  energy crisis.  This crisis particularly 
affected a  number  of  ~ncrgy-intensivc agricultural  sectors -particularly 
horticulture under glass.  A number  of Member  States felt that  this 
"si tua.tion called for  support measures, 
The  Comnission's  view is that  the new  situation on  the  energy market is 
not transitional but a  long-term fact,  a.l though this does  not means  that 
its affects will not vary in the  short-term  from  country to country 
depending on  the various weys  in which  the Eember  States plan their energy 
policies,  Each  sector of the  econonw  must  seek its own  wa:y  of adapting 
to the long-term change in circumstances.  If individual  subsidies were 
given to permanently offset price differences without limit in time,  this 
would  simply have the unacceptable  consequence  that the  less and less 
abundant  supply  of energy would  not  be used economically. 
On  the  other hn.nd  there is justification for assisting those  concerned to 
adjust to the  new  situation by means  of short-tonn measures,  provided  th~t 
the other conditions,  specified by the  Commission  in a  CommUnication  to 
the Nember  States,  a.re  met. - 13  - X/469/74-E 
One  of these conditions is that price increases must  have  threatened the 
very  e:z.:istenoe  of the  relc-vur.t  unC!ert.::;.k.ing  rmd  that  this must threc:.ten 
major social or  rogion~l problems.  In such cases the  ComMission has 
not  opposed the  po{{ment  by the Mer.1ber  Strotes of compensatory  pa:Jrments 1 
whether as  a  lump  ~~m or over a  period of time.  In all  c~ses notified 
to the  Commission the  compensatory pc:.yments  did not  even  cover half the 
prj_ce  inc::.•eaces  for enc.:rgy  products.  For  ?.  number of reasons  1  particularly 
tl1e  fc..d  tLat tbe  enGrgy  policies of the Member  Stntes are not yet 
ha.rmoni zed,  the  Commis::;ion  ha,s  refrained from initiating it::;.  mm action in 
this fiE::ld under the European Agricultural Pund. 
10.  This  outlinG  of the .Luropea:n aid policy  shovm  that in the foreseeable 
future  the  ~~ember States t-rill  remain indi  vicludly responsible for financing 
policies on agricultural structure and any  other necessary short-term 
measures.  Application of the  rules of competition in the EEC  Tree.t~r 
ca.nnot lew to preventi!l-:; or even hindering all national promotion meesuros. 
Their function is simply to make  sure that these me2-sures  do  not lead to 
apprccir.ble  rec,tr:!..ctions  on  coJ::~.petition. 
IV. 
Restrictive yractices and abnse  of  econo~oNer 
11.  A second category of n1les  on  conpetition in the  EEC  Tr0aty  concerns 
policy·  on  restrictive practices and abuses  of economic  powE:.r. Dealing firstly with  abuse  of economic  pmv-cr  in rcle.tion to c,gricul  ture, 
any cbuse  of a  domina."lt  :position within the  comraon  market  or in a 
substential part of it is prohibited  ~s incompatible with the  common 
me.rket  in so far as it may  effect  tracle between Member  States.  An 
abuse  may  arise llhere unfair purchasing or selling prices or other unfr:dr 
trading conditions  e.re  imposed.  These  rules,  laid down  in Article 86 
of the  EEC  Treos.t;y,  arc entirely applicable to production of  m1d  trade  i:r. 
agricultural products.  'F1e  ci  tuation o.ssumes  tha.t  one  or more  u~~C.cl·"-::~:::.:  .. 
hold a  dominant  position on at  lea~t a  substantial part of the  common 
market.  Monopolistic  or oligopolistic structures of this kind arc to be 
found in agriculture in a  number  of states.  Nhere  the uno.erte!kings use 
their n:mrket  pm>~er to the  detriment  of their corrpeti  tors or trace pe.rtncrs, 
they would be  caught by Article 86. 
12.  The  situ2..tion is different as  regards the specific area of restrictive 
prnctice  c.  The  relevant rules in the  EEC  Tl'eaty apply  to agriculture 
1-rith  tv:o  exceptions:  for one  thine: they do not  apply v;here  c~greements or 
concerted practices which  t·.rould  othenlire be  caught  by the rules are 
necesser:t for the  e.tt£\.inmcnt  of the  objectives of the cgricul  turai policy 
under the EEC  Treaty.  In view of the  flood of legislation from Brussels 
in recent years  covering agricultural policy throughout  the  Community,  it 
must be  assumed that,  in the  cbsence  of specific provisions,  all the 
necessary legal  steps have been or are being taken to achieve these aims, 
at least in  rE.:sp~ct  of those  agricU.iturai  products \'lhich  are  subject to 
European market  organizdio:ns.  ~Jaturally a  merger  (e.g.  of orange traders) 
may  in some  t-ray  serve to nchievo  the  generall-y heterogcnous  objectives of 
the agricultural policy defined in the  EEC  Treaty;  if it is not necessary, 
it will be prohibi  tod by the  rules in the  Treaty. -15- X/469/74-E 
This  interpretation is backed up b;;r  the fact  tht~t  some  of tho br.sic 
regula~ions confGr particular functions  on producers'  organizations 
(fruit end vegetables 1  fish)and producer groups  (hops),  which  are  ~ 
euphemism for dooinant bodies controlling the  agricultural markets. 
A cont:l'srio,  where  the legislator mc>Jces  no  mention of them,  they are not 
a  necessar~ means  of achieving the  aims  of Article 39  EEC. 
A  second exception from  the  general provisions  on restrictive prac-tices 
in the  EEC  Treaty relates to agreements between  agricultur~l cooperatives 
t"<herc'  without restricting prices policy'  they relate to the  production 
or marketing of agricultural produce  or the use  of  joint-ovmed equipment 
for storing or p-rocessing agricultural produce.  This "cooperative 
privilege" takes  cooperatives  out  of the scope  of the  competi-tion rules 
of tile  EEC  Treat~',  although  ar'!.mi tted.ly subject to there being  no price 
restrictions, i.e., subject to the price PRYnble  by purchasers at the next 
trading stage not being determined.  This privilege furthermore .docs not 
apply where  tho  Co~~ission finds that it would eliminate  competition or 
jeop£',rdize  thG  aims  of Article 39,  i.e., the  aims  of the  Community 
agricultural policy.  Thus  here  there is v,  legal presumption of compatibi-
lity with the  common  market,  tvhich  the  Commision  cen rebut in individual 
cases. 
13.  Here it should be  mentioned that as long as  eigb.t years  ago the 
Commission  attempted to  go  beyond this mere  negative  encour~gment for 
producers'  organizations  w.1d  positively  promo~o  ·their formation by 
transmitting a  proposal  fr;r  a  regulation to the Council providing for - 16- X/469/74-E 
subsidies to assist the  creation of such  oreanizations.  Two  principal 
considerations were  invoked to back up  the proposal:  firstly,  the large 
number of farms  working relatively small areas are  a  hindrar.ce to increasing 
productivity in agriculture  o.nd  the  rational development  of production and 
stMd in the  way  of the  optir!!UIII  use  of production fe,ctors.  The  drr:,ft 
recites the.t  "these disr.dvcmtages  can be partly remedied if farmers  combine 
to carry on their r,ctivities together".  A second consideration  ~'las  that 
divergent national provisions for the promotion of agTicultural producers' 
organizations should be  h~rmonizcd so  as to  avoid discrimination between 
Community producers. 
Although the proposal has recci  ved wide  approval, it has not ;yet  been 
adopted  b~,r  the  Council.  For  r:,  number  of years it never appeared  on the 
agenda.  This  does  not  mean  that a  regulation on producers'  organizations 
will never be  adopted.  Indeed .it is likely that the  Council will resume 
considcrc.tion of it before the  end  of the year. 
v. 
~~Iarket  struci;ures. 
14.  vJhe.tcver happens,  the  Commission will be  sending the Council  a  further 
proposal  which  should encourase it to  resume  consideration of the producers' 
orgru1izations.  This is the proposal for common  measures to  improve the 
conditions in which agricultural products are marketed.  The  proposal 
fits into the general  context  of European agricul  ture,l policies as follows. - 17  - X/469/74-E 
01:.e  of t:1e  nost  effective instruments  of this  Df.,-Ticul tural policy is the 
Guidance Section of the European Agricultural  Fund.  This is the  source 
of Commission finance  for pri  ve~,te  indi  vidue.l  products in the Member  States 
in the  form  of non-reimbursGble  loe~s.  In 1971,  for instance,  ~33 million 
units of rcco,_mt  -vmre  clevoted to improving production structures  and 
59  milli8n uni~s of  ~ccount were  devoted to improving the marketing 
structl~res for a.::;ricultural  p::.·oducts  (a 2:1  ratio)  .. 
The  financing of incli  vidnal products relating to production structures is 
due  to  come  to an  end since increasingly and,  in the  ne<.".r  future,  exclusively 
it is to be  replaced by  rei1:1bursement  of part of the  ~rember States' 
e:x:pendi ture under the  ~~~shol  t  Plan,  including investment  r:.ids  for the 
modernization of farms  and  outgoer P<liJ'1!1ents.  ~ese l!leasures  Nill have 
a  p::.•iori t;r claim  on  Community  funds.  If this is also to be  extended to 
mu.rketing structures, it \1Till  be necessary to find a  nel"l  legal basis for 
such finance  and projects will have  to be  given the form  of  joint measures. 
The  abovementioned  Commission proposal  Nould  achieve  this. 
One  special feature  of the proposal  is the  fact that in the  future  individual 
projects reJ.ating to marketing structures will  continue to  rE..ceive 
assist~ce but  only if the;~•  f<i.ll  within the  conte::..rt  of a  sectoral progreJlli!le 
which,  although not  actudl;<;r  compulsory,  mus-t  exist if Community  funds  are 
to be  cornmi tted.  This  should make  it possible to investigate the  commercial 
profi  to,bili  ty of the project in relation to the  general  economic  context 
of the  relevant  sector. - 18-
Projects which  do  not  comply  t·ri th the relevant  rules on  competition will 
continue  to be  excluded from  Community  finRncing.  Moreover if such 
projects e,re  to be financed by the  Community,  then the projects  ther~selves 
and the  fin~cial resources  devoted to them  must  directly or indirectly 
benefit ar,ricUltural producers.  Resources  from  the e,gricul  ture,l  fund 
are not to be  made  available for purely industrial  or regional  purposes. 
Each  individual  applicant  raust  prove that the project  ~'lill  be  bt;neficie-
1
• 
to  agricultur~l production.  It is unlikely that there will be  a  legal 
provision in respect  of this to the  effect that when  this o:r  that fact is 
proved,  then the project tvill be beneficial to e,gricul  tural producers. 
To  give preferential trer,tment  to particular legal  forms  of agricultural 
cooperation in this way  t'lould be unacceptfl,blc,  if only because  of the 
principle of non-discrimination applied in the  Community.  But  this does 
not  change  the  fact  that  t~e easier an  applicant finds it to prove  the 
benefit,  the  easier it i'ri) 1  be  for the Fund  to consider his applice,tion. 
One  possible  way  of proving· the b(;;neficial  effect on  agriculture would be 
to  shew that long-term supply contracts have  been concluded between 
producers r.nd  buyers.  The  contracts  >-!ould  be  assessed on  the basis not 
only of their duration but also,  and  above  all, of their terms.  As  a 
result of the broad variety in long-term contracts depending  on  different 
circumstances in individual  countries areas  and products it does  not  seem 
appropriate for  Community  bodies to produce  a  uniform standard contract  or 
even to give the parties to  such model  contracts the right to priority 
treatment when  subsidies  are  granted. - 19  - X/469/74-E 
VI. 
And  so  we  bring our brief analysis of a  few  problems  relating to conditions 
of compcti  tion in the European agriculture to en end with  an idea of uhat 
the legislator proposes to do  in the future.  Unfortunately a  considerable 
proportion of the time  end energy of the officials working in Brussels has 
for some  time  no\'1 been devoted to  endeavours to preserve the Community 
structure as far as possible.  And  yet in times  of repeated cri11es  and 
uncertain developments,  our eyes  should not be  closed to the future. 
~Jcamples from  other areas,  to which  less attention has perhaps been paid 
in the past  1'  often suggest  means  of solving problems  of apparently 
different nature.  Compe·i;i tion as  a  devic.e  for controlling the European 
agricultural market  ~~d competition policy as  an element  of European 
agricu.l  turr,l policy now  point the vmy  to  a  gre.:l.ter number  of practical 
solutions than t·rere  possible in the pa.st.  Karket  and price policy, 
agricul~1r~l structure policy and  Community  law on  competition together 
fo~ the,  ov~rall complex of European agricultural policy.  Hhatever has 
been said to the  contrary,  it is the  agricul~ral policy which,  overcoming 
numerous  difficulties, has turned out to be  a  major factor, if not the 
major factor,  holding the Member  States of the European Community  together. - 20- X/469/74-E 
The  Ye2-rbook  contains nore than J.6  000 full  addresses  1  with telephone 
and telex nuffibers,  end is divideu ir.to five  sections,  the most  important 
being: 
- A li::lt  of the major uholesale importers in the  EEC 1  Switzerland and 
Austria ar"!"3.11ged  by  country end region; 
-A five-language  (i.e.,French,  Ge~an, Italian, Dutch and English) 
alphabeti0al product  indeY covering the  66  best-known products,  ~-Ihich 
is followed by  separate lists giving the  ad&resses  of the  main growers 
of these proQucts. 
The  Yee,rbook  also give  the addresses  of canning and pickling factories  1 
freezing plants,  international carriers, banks,  insurance  companies, 
packaging specialists etc. 
The  informati0n assembled in this publication will help to make  the 
differen-t  sectors of the  common  market  in r,grioul  ture more transpar·ent. 
It  shoul~ facilitate the  search for new  outlets and  the  rapid movGment 
of goods within the  Community. 
!ir Laro.inois,  the  Commissioner 1-v:i.th  responsibility for agriculture,  has 
given the  pub"1.icu.tion his blessing  and r,rritten the preface. 
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